Priority in the use of a novel meaning of a term is no cause for pride; in fact it betrays a lack of "terminological discipline" and a want of linguistic inventiveness-for when a writer creates or modifies a concept he ought also to coin a new word to denote it, rather than corrupt the language and spread confusion. '
cepts should be operational in the broadest sense, although this should not be interpreted as requiring quantification. Second: Concepts that establish definitional connections with other terms are to be preferred. Third: Concepts that draw attention to theoretically important aspects of the subject matter that might easily be overlooked are desirable. Fourth: Concepts should not preclude empirical investigation by making true "by definition" what had better be left open to empirical inquiry. Fifth: Concepts should remain reasonably close to ordinary language. "Ordinary language," however, does not necessarily mean the way most people would define the term, but rather the "set of rules they implicitly follow when applying it to a given situation." Sixth: The meaning of concepts should be "open" in the sense that the possibility of change is never completely ruled out.
The various criteria suggested by Malthus and Oppenheim will be discussed later with reference to recent scholarly treatments of dependence.'4 For now it suffices to point out that Machlup, Malthus, and Oppenheim all agree that, ceteris paribus, deviations from common usage are undesirable characteristics in scientific concepts and that such deviations call for careful explanation and justification. Special care in discussing the nature and methods of conceptual analysis prior to examining the concept of interdependence is in order because much of the recent scholarly work on international and transnational dependence fails to satisfy the criteria articulated by either Malthus or Oppenheim.
What follows is an explication of the concept of dependence in its most general and fundamental sense. It should be noted at the outset that some would deny that explication of a generic concept of dependence serves a useful analytic purpose.'5 Since the arguments for and against this position were cogently stated in Robert Dahl's classic article on "The Concept of Power,"'16 there is no need to repeat them here. Dahl sought to capture the basic intuitive notion of power in the same sense that this essay will pursue the basic intuitive notion of dependence that underlies discussions of dependence, dependency, interdependence, or independence. Thus, references to concepts of dependence in the following discussion are meant to apply, mutatis mutandis, to these related terms as well.
To favor the elucidation of general abstract concepts of power or dependence, however, does not commit one to the view that discussions of actual power or dependence relations should be carried on at very high levels of abstraction. It is not illogical to advocate that a clearly defined generic concept of power (or dependence) be used to develop low-and/or medium-level generalizations rather than highly abstract ones.'7 In short, there is a difference between defining a concept and applying it.
The concept of dependence: 1568-1968
Conventional usage is a basic reference point for evaluating scientific concepts according to Malthus, Machlup, and Oppenheim. In explicating the concept of dependence, the single most important question concerns conventional usage. Both the everyday usage by laymen and traditional scholarly usage will be examined. Since international and transnational dependence is of particular interest to the writer and likely readers of this essay, particular attention will be devoted to usage in the context of world affairs.
Common usage
Raymond Duvall provides a useful discussion of the two basic meanings of "dependence" in ordinary language.'8 On the one hand, "dependence" is used in a causal sense to refer to situations in which an effect is contingent on or conditioned by something else. Keohane and Nye are apparently referring to this usage when they note that "in common parlance, dependence means a state of being determined or significantly affected by external forces."'9 On the other hand, "dependence" is also used to refer to a relationship of subordination in which one thing is supported by something else or must rely upon something else for fulfillment of a need. It is apparently this second meaning that Caporaso refers to as "the familiar, common sense" usage of the term. 20 Duvall points out that the two basic meanings of "dependence" correspond to the distinction often made between "sensitivity interdependence" and "vulnerability interdependence."2' Whereas the first 17 The arguments for a contextual approach to power analysis consist largely of spelling out the implications of the absence of a political counterpart to money. See David A. Baldwin meaning implies mere contingency, the second implies need fulfillment that would be costly to forego.
Duvall's discussion notes that the two basic meanings of "dependence" can be traced back for several centuries. Although Duvall offers no documentation for this, his assertions are compatible with the Oxford English Dictionary. 22 Perusal of the OED, however, furnishes additional clues relating to usage in different contexts. The preponderance of references to world affairs pertain to the second meaning.23 The OED provides examples of the second meaning with regard to "depend," "dependence," "dependency," and "dependent." In every case examples concerning world affairs are included. Especially noteworthy is a seventeenth-century reference to "the effect of depending upon forraign Countries for Hemps, " a reference comparable in meaning and context to contemporary discussions of "vulnerability dependence. " Neither the concept of vulnerability dependence nor its usage in the context of world affairs is new. If the OED is taken as an authority, it would appear that this second meaning of "dependence" is more conventional than the first in discussions of world politics and economics.
Scholarly usage: general
Scholarly usage, of course, sometimes diverges from that of the layman; therefore, conventions among scholars should be considered. Conventional treatments by economists and international relations scholars are of most direct relevance to international and transnational dependence. Scholarly discussions do not always explicitly state a definition of "dependence," thus leaving the reader two basic strategies for determining what the author has in mind. First, one might reasonably assume that failure to provide an explicit definition indicates that the author is following common usage, in which case the previous discussion suggests that the second meaning is the more likely. Second, one can look for contextual clues. Since both basic meanings of "dependence" involve influence in its broadest sense, it is not much help to look for words like "affect,' ''change," "influence," "impinge," "induce," or "cause." The crucial difference between the first and second meaning of "dependence" has to do with the ease of breaking the relationship; "sen- sitivity interdependence" implies nothing about the cost of altering the relationship.24 Thus, if one finds a relationship or its effects referred to as "necessary," "ineluctable," "inevitable," "inextricable," or "unavoidable," it is grounds for suspicion that the author has in mind a relationship that would be costly to break. Likewise, if terms such as "need," "compel," "must," "constraint," or "Hobson's choice" are used to describe the relationship, it seems fair to infer that the second meaning of "dependence" is the relevant one. If "dependence" is used with reference to "self-sufficiency," "autarky," or the ability of one actor to "do without" another, the opportunity costs of foregoing the relationship would seem to be the underlying concern.
Scholarly usage: economists
In 1972 Richard Cooper asserted that " 'economic interdependence' normally refers to the dollar value of economic transactions among regions or countries, either in absolute terms, or relative to their total transactions." He distinguished this "normal usage" from his more restricted concept of "the sensitivity of economic transactions between two or more nations to economic developments within those nations."25 In 1973 Tollison and Willett referred to Cooper's sensitivity concept as representing "normal usage by economists."26 Without disputing the rapid progress of the discipline of economics, "normal usage" would appear to change with remarkable speed. In 1979 Marina v. N. Whitman reiterated the assertion of Tollison and Willett that "as generally understood by economists, the term interdependence refers to the sensitivity of economic behavior in one country to developments or policies originating outside its own borders."27 If such references are taken to mean that many economists think of interdependence in terms of the mutual sensitivity of economic variables, they can be supported with evidence. If, however, such references are interpreted to mean that economists since the time of Adam Smith have characteristically favored the first meaning of "dependence," 24 "Costs" in this essay always refer to "opportunity costs." Although dependency may be defined in terms of the costs of "breaking" a relationship, it can also refer to alterations in the relationship short of total severance. This point is of little consequence for the argument in this essay, however; and the terms "breaking," "altering," "severing," and "foregoing" will be used interchangeably. 25 based on contingency, rather than the second, based on need, supporting evidence is difficult to find.
The most important thing to note about economists' usage of "dependence" or "interdependence" is that clarity is lacking. They rarely offer an explicit definition of the concept, rarely include it in the index of a book, and often omit it from dictionaries of economic terminology. 28 It has not been an important analytic term for most economists. This is not to say that references to "dependence" cannot be found. In explaining the benefits of specialization and exchange, Adam Smith made it clear that dependency was a likely consequence in the sense that exchange relationships involved benefits that satisfied mutual needs and which would therefore, by definition, be costly to forego.29 Ramsay Muir has described Smith as having "revolutionized economic science by working out the theory of interdependence";30 and Albert 0. Hirschman has contended that "no one has yet given a better picture of the nature of 'dependence on trade.' "31 Hirschman drew attention to the intimate connection between the concept of "gain from trade" and the concept of dependence:
The influence which country A acquires in country B by foreign trade depends in the first place upon the total gain which B derives from that trade; the total gain from trade for any country is indeed nothing but another expression for the total impoverishment which would be inflicted upon it by a stoppage of trade. In this sense the classical concept, gain from trade, and the power concept, dependence on trade, now being studied are seen to be merely two aspects of the same phenomenon.32
It should be noted that Hirschman did not view the conceptual linkage between "gains from trade" and "dependence" as redefining the latter concept, but rather as clarifying it. And rightly so, for he simply provided a more precise statement of the second basic meaning of "dependence." This concept of "dependence" in terms of the opportunity costs of foregoing trade has been 28 It would be a mistake to depict Hirschman's usage as "mere trade dependence." Although Hirschman's work happens to focus on trade, his explication of the concept of dependence is applicable to a wide range of social exchange relationships.34 If the term "interaction" is substituted for "trade" each time it appears in the previous quotation, this point will become clear.
To show that economists have often used "dependence" in its second meaning does not establish such usage as "normal"; however, it does justify a certain amont of skepticism with regard to undocumented assertions that ''sensitivity interdependence" represents normal usage by economists. Some economists, of course, have used "dependence" in its first meaning to refer to contingent relations. Ellsworth, for example, seems to employ "dependence" in this sense in discussing the interdependence of national currencies, even though he seems to use the second meaning of "dependence" in discussing why trade takes place.3" Machlup uses "interdependence" in the sense of the covariance of economic variables most of the time; but when referring to the relationship between national power and self-sufficiency, he seems to revert to the second meaning of "dependence."36 And many of the essays in a volume recently edited by Robert Aliber apparently employ "interdependence" to refer to the covariance of economic variables. 37
In the last two decades or so, economists' usage of the term interdependence has become so confusing that a brief digression from my main argument is in order. In addition to using "interdependence" to refer to relations that would be mutually costly to forego, some economists have used it interchangeably with "integration," "openness," and "mutual sensitivity. "II Each of these terms represents an analytically distinct concept, and none corresponds to "interdependence" in the sense of relations that would be mutually costly to break. "Openness" refers to the degree of interaction with the outside world and is usually measured in terms of the ratio of foreign trade to GNP.39 "Sensitivity" refers to the covariance of economic variables. And "integration," as Machlup's careful explication has shown, has as its essential defining characteristic the degree to which opportunities for efficient division of labor are used.40 Each of these concepts has different uses and different empirical referents; thus, it is desirable to distinguish among them. This does not rule out the possibility that a particular research project might employ an operational definition of interdependence in terms of "openness"; but it does imply that appropriate qualifications should be stated.
In sum, economists have paid little attention to "dependence" as a scientific concept but have frequently-dare I say "normally"?-used the term in its commonsense second meaning. I have failed to locate a single economist's The concept of interdependence, as used by international relations scholars, is often accused of having a normative bias and of being ill-defined.45 Although specific examples are rarely cited by the accusers, some could probably be found. There is little evidence, however, that scholarly discussions of international interdependence from the time of Machiavelli to about 1960 were characterized by ill-defined or normatively biased concepts of dependency.
The charge of a normative bias in earlier conceptualizations of interdependence rests on a misconception of the traditional concept of the "benefits" of interdependence and a failure to distinguish between normative and factual concepts.
Keohane and Nye object to defining interdependence in terms of "mutual benefit." "In some cases," they contend, "an interdependent relationship may have such negative consequences that both parties would be quite happy to cease contact with one another entirely, forgoing any benefits that such contact may bring." They cite a "tense and rapidly escalating arms race" as an example." The obvious question, of course, is why either party would continue a relationship that both would prefer to end. Arms races can be ended by either side at any time. Human beings can always break off a social relationship. Mass suicide is perhaps the most extreme option, but it is not without some historical precedent. The point, of course, is that mutually unpleasant relationships of interdependence, such as arms races, are maintained because the likely alternatives would be even more unpleasant. The only reason to continue strategic interdependence between the United States and the Soviet Union is that the alternative might be worse. The "benefits" of interdependence, thus, are simply another way of stating the opportunity costs of severing the relationship. No matter how "bad" an interdependent relationship may be, it is presumably preferable to the most likely alternative. The "benefits" implied by the traditional concept of interdependence-i.e., in its second meaning-are not defined in absolute terms, but rather in terms of likely alternative situations. Avoiding value deprivation, after all, is just as much a "benefit" as is value augmentation. Thus, contrary to the view of Keohane and Nye, defining interdependence in terms of the "mutual benefits" Sir Norman drew the conclusion from this anecdote that the degree of interdependence varies inversely with the effectiveness of force. This story is a remarkably concise summary of the basic elements of the arguments presented by Sir Norman, Muir, and Delaisi. First, the situation involves division of labor since neither man can both row and bail. Second, exchange is involved in the sense that each man trades his labor for the other's-"I will row if you will bail." Third, there are mutual benefits of this exchange in that they both stay alive. Fourth, each is dependent on the other in the sense that the opportunity costs of breaking the relationship are high. Fifth, this reciprocal dependency constrains each party's behavior with respect to the other. Sixth, dependency is portrayed as a rather unpleasant "fact of life" to be endured and adjusted to rather than as a godsend to be celebrated. And seventh, Sir Norman's conclusion about the effects of interdependence on the effectiveness of force is-a plausible, empirically testable proposition. It may not be true; but it is, in principle, falsifiable. The arguments of Sir Norman, Muir, and Delaisi are simply amplifications of the story of the leaky boat in terms of international relations. The process of international specialization and exchange is viewed as creating international interdependence (empirical observation). The world is becoming, or has become, so interdependent that without world government (or disarmament or whatever) the achievement of many values to which people now subscribe, such as peace and economic well-being, will be impeded or prevented (empirical proposition).52 The logical implication of such arguments is that if people are willing to tolerate a world in which life is nasty, brutish, and short, world government is unnecessary. Far from presenting a rosy picture of an interdependent world, such arguments imply that such a world will be most unpleasant unless appropriate adaptive measures are taken-e.g., world government or disarmament. This may be mistaken or naive, but it is a line of argument that is, in principle, empirically testable.53 It is not a normative argument, and it is not based on a normative concept of interdependence.
Although Delaisi, Muir, and Sir Norman may not present a "rigorous" definition of interdependence, it is quite clear what they mean by it. They are using the term in the same way it had been used for centuries: to refer to international relationships that would be costly to break. They have in mind the same basic concept of dependency as that employed by Machiavelli, Montesquieu, Rousseau, Adam Smith, and Malthus. Hirschman and Waltz would later use the term in this same sense.
Keohane and Nye contend that interpendence has "normally" been 52 Morse attributes to Muir the view that the growth of interdependence is a "requisite for the abolition of interstate conflict." [Foreign Policy and Interdependence, p. 51, and "Interdependence in World Affairs," pp. 662-63.] Actually, Muir's argument is that the abolition of war is a requisite for survival in an interdependent world in the sense that an interdependent world will be very unpleasant unless war is abolished. 53 Neither the naivete nor the falsity of this line of argument is as obvious to this writer as it appears to some. defined simply as a condition in which events in one part of the world covary with events in other parts of the world."4 Such usage, as Duvall" has pointed out, corresponds to the first basic meaning of "dependence" -i.e., as a conditional relationship. If "normal usage" is intended to apply only to the last decade or so, Keohane and Nye may well be correct; but if a longer time period is considered, the validity of their assertion is less obvious.
International relations scholars have tended to discuss dependence and interdependence with reference to self-sufficiency and the vulnerability of a state to alterations in certain kinds of international relationships, especially trade. 56 Such usage implies the second meaning of "dependence," since, by definition, the costs of severing trade relations will be lower for self-sufficient states than for dependent ones. William E. Rappard cites a rather bizarre example of mutual dependence during World War I in which the costs of breaking off trade were so high that two states on opposing sides carried on some trade with each other. 57 The work of Karl Deutsch is of special interest since it is frequently cited in discussions of interdependence. Deutsch's work contains examples of both basic meanings of "dependence." In 1954 Deutsch referred to "interdependence" in terms of the "interlocking relationships" arising from the "division of labor" between "highly specialized" political units. In addition, he distinguished this "interdependence" from a relationship of "mutual responsiveness" among political units that might not be dependent upon each other-i.e., might be able to do without each other's aid.58 Although Deutsch's concept of "mutual responsiveness" does not correspond directly to the first meaning of dependence, his concept of interdependence clearly corresponds to the second meaning as elucidated by Hirschman, Sir Norman By 1966, however, Deutsch had abandoned this earlier concept of interdependence and was defining interdependence in terms of the covariance of aspects of different systems, a usage corresponding to both the first basic meaning of "dependence" and to the current concept of "sensitivity interdependence."60 I have been unable to locate in Deutsch's writings any acknowledgment, explanation, or justification for this shift from the traditional concept of international interdependence to a fundamentally different one.
In sum, contentions that traditional international relations usage of the term "interdependence" has been normatively biased, that it has been unclear, or that it has corresponded with "sensitivity interdependence," are all questionable. The works surveyed here suggest that the concept has been reasonably clear, generally understood, factually oriented, and has corresponded with "vulnerability interdependence." Prior to 1960 one was reasonably safe in assuming that references to "dependency" by international relations scholars corresponded to the second basic meaning as explicated by Hirschman, Muir, Delaisi, and others. Since this "traditional usage" no longer seems to be "normal," a consideration of more recent treatments of dependency relations is in order. 1 1) , suggest that he has in mind the opportunity costs of selfsufficiency. "Mutual sensitivity" does not capture the meaning of the above passages. Relations of "mutual sensitivity" can always be severed-except when they are "necessary" in the sense that it would be costly to extricate oneself or one's country from them. "Compel," "must, " "need, " and "constraint" imply more than mere sensitivity or influence; they imply something about the cost of one's other options.
One of the most revealing passages in Cooper's discussion of interdependence is the following:
As with marriage, the benefits of close international economic relations can be enjoyed only at the expense of giving up a certain amount of national independence.65
Although it is not specifically acknowledged, the concept of interdependence as relations that would be mutually costly to forego is embedded in this passage. If the benefits of marriage can be acquired only by a loss of independence, it follows that dissolving the marriage will entail a loss of such benefits. Cooper's explication of the "gains from marriage" exactly parallels Hirschman's explication of the relationship between the "gains from trade" and "dependency. "66 Cooper's book is not really "about interdependence" at all, at least not if that implies a major concern with describing the nature of interdependence. That the world is highly interdependent is not so much a hypothesis to be tested as it is an assumption to use as a springboard for what really interests Cooper-i.e., the policy implications and consequences of interdependence. Cooper makes this clear at the end of his introduction, when he notes that "the remainder of the book discusses the problems created by a growing economic interdependence and explores some of the possible ways for solving these problems."67 Now discussing the nature of power is one thing; discussing its effects is another; just as discussing the nature of sovereignty is one thing and discussing its consequences is another. Likewise, discussing the nature of interdependence and discussing the problems it creates are two separate issues. The key to understanding this alleged "classic study of interdependence" is the realization that it is not about interdependence, but rather about the consequences of interdependence.
Two years after the publication of Cooper's Economics of Interdependence, Waltz published an article disputing what he perceived as a widely held contention that international interdependence was high, growing, and/or likely to promote peace.68 He pointed out that the cost of disengagement from a given relationship was a measure of dependency. There is no indication in the article that Waltz perceived himself as inventing a new or unusual concept of dependency; yet other scholars repeatedly credit him with having "proposed, "69 "developed,"70 or "introduced"7" this notion. Indeed, Waltz himself has apparently been convinced, since he has recently described himself as "offering" this concept as an alternative to the "common" conception of sensitivity interdependence. Interdependence: "sensitivity" versus "vulnerability"
The distinction between "sensitivity interdependence," defined in terms of mutual "effects," and "vulnerability interdependence," defined in terms of the opportunity costs of disrupting the relationship, has become plicitly points to the correspondence between his concept of "interdependence as mutual vulnerability" and "everyday usage" (p. 143). widely accepted and is usually attributed to Keohane and Nye." The question to be addressed here is whether this distinction should be maintained, reformulated, or perhaps relabeled. The arguments in favor of retention of the distinction will be considered first.
The first, and most important reason to maintain the distinction is that it differentiates quite different phenomena. Sensitivity and vulnerability do not necessarily covary to the same degree or even in the same direction.78
Second, as Duvall79 has noted, the distinction corresponds to the two basic meanings of "dependence" for the last four hundred years. It thus seems to be more fundamental than such distinctions as "strategic interdependence,". "systemic interdependence," or "public goods interdependence."80 And third, there is a tradition of a decade or so of "conventional usage," at least by students of international relations.
The arguments against maintaining the distinction concern conventional usage, the possibility of confusion, and alternative ways of making the distinction.
The first objection to the distinction is that it contravenes common usage. As Caporaso, Waltz, Muir, and the OED have pointed out, "vulnerability interdependence" corresponds to everyday usage, at least with reference to world affairs."8 Contrary to Keohane and Nye, in common parlance "dependence" does not mean a state of being "significantly affected by external forces."82 A person that has been "significantly affected" by the "external force" of alcohol is called a "drunk," not an "alcoholic"; there is a difference. The Internal Revenue Service does not allow one to claim as "dependents" everyone on whom one has significant effects. When the "manin-the-street" refers to American "dependence" on foreign oil, he has in mind the opportunity costs of doing without it, not the elasticity of prices. 83 Those who would like to submit this proposition about the views of the mass public to empirical testing might frame questions along the following lines: "If you lived within easy walking distance of ten drugstores, would you feel dependent on any one of them?" "If there were only one drugstore within fifty miles of your home, would you feel dependent on it?" The "man in the street" may not speak in terms of "the opportunity costs of foregoing a relationship," but he has a firm grasp of the underlying concept.
Price sensitivity of oil would not matter one whit to the man-in-the-street if he had affordable alternative ways to heat his house and run his car. The price of caviar in the U.S. may be "sensitive" to price changes in other countries, but no one has suggested that America is "dependent" on caviar.
Although scholarly usage during the last decade favors retention of the distinction, the case is less persuasive if one examines scholarly usage during the last two or three centuries. The works surveyed earlier in this essay suggest that "vulnerability interdependence" has a superior claim to the mantle of conventionality, at least in international relations, and perhaps even in economics.
A second objection to the distinction is that it is factually misleading. Cooper identifies the problem in the following passage:
The value of trade to a country, in terms of its contribution to national welfare [i.e., the gains from trade], may depend neither on the sensitivity nor on the magnitude of the flows, although it is more likely to be related to the magnitude than to the sensitivity. Indeed, value and sensitivity are inversely related in one important respect: high sensitivity results precisely from the capacity of a country to substitute domestic for foreign production or investment, in response to relatively small margins of advantage; yet when such substitution is easily possible at relatively low cost, the value per dollar of trade or investment to the country is correspondingly diminished."4
In effect, Cooper is admitting that what he calls "interdependence" may be inversely related to what Hirschman has called "interdependence." It is bad enough to ignore and/or to distort conventional usage; but it is worse to introduce a concept that is inversely related to common usage.
The third, and perhaps the most telling, argument against maintaining the "sensitivity/vulnerability" distinction is that other terms are available for making the desired distinction. As Duvall has observed, statements about dependence in its first sense are so broad as to be almost devoid of substantive content; they tell us that two variables covary, but that is about all.85 Many terms can be used to convey the idea of covariance-e.g., "influence," "affect," "impinge," "change," "induce," or "cause." It is fine for Cooper to emphasize the importance of "the sensitivity of economic transactions between two or more nations to economic developments within those nations";86 but why call this "interdependence"? Terms like "mutual influence,9" "mutual responsiveness," or "mutual sensitivity" convey the idea at least as well without debasing the time-honored, and still useful, concept of vulnerability interdependence.
In sum, there is a distinction between drug users and drug addicts, be- tween drinkers and alcoholics, between being sensitive to others and being dependent on them, between influence in general and dependence as a special type of influence. It is a distinction that has been recognized and understood by scholars and laymen alike for centuries. It is a distinction that the concept of "sensitivity interdependence" blurs, but which is captured with precision and parsimony by the Hirschman-Waltz concept of dependence. Let us retain the concept of "sensitivity interdependence" but change the label to something less misleading, such as "mutual sensitivity."
"Dependence" versus "dependency" Caporaso and Duvall have recently suggested that a fundamental distinction should be made between "dependence" and "dependency."87 Whereas "dependence" refers to "external reliance on other actors," "dependency" refers to "the process of incorporation of less developed countries (LDCs) into the global capitalist system and the 'structural distortions' resulting therefrom."88 Although both Caporaso and Duvall admit some similarity between the concepts, they emphasize the differences. "Dependence," as used by Caporaso, corresponds to "common sense" usage and to "vulnerability dependence."89 "Dependency," however, has no basis in conventional usage, "can only be understood (i.e., its original and intended meaning is preserved) only within a certain body of historical, political, and sociological thought," and perhaps cannot be reduced to a concept at all. 90
All of this sounds rather mystifying until one considers the purpose of the essays by Caporaso and Duvall. Duvall's purpose is to promote and facilitate a "dialogue" between what he calls "First World" scholars committed to 'rigorous empirical social science"9' and "Third World" scholars, mostly Latin American, committed to "dependencia theory." Caporaso states his purpose more broadly, but he is also obviously interested in "understanding" dependencia theory. After stating the need to differentiate between "dependence" and "dependency," he justifies it as follows: The first objection to defining "dependency" a la Latin America is that it constitutes a sharp deviation from several centuries of common usage. Although Caporaso94 admits this divergence, there is no indication that he sees it as a drawback of the proposed redefinition of "dependency." To admit this redefinition of "dependency," however, is to start down the proverbial "slippery slope." What if scholars in the Philippines and Russia propose new concepts of "dependency?" Must we then speak of "Filipino-dependency," "Russo-dependency," "Latino-dependency," and "Gringo-dependency?" To redefine "dependency" in terms of "a certain body of historical, political, and sociological thought" is to open the floodgates for numerous redefinitions based on different bodies of "historical, political, and sociological thought." It is, in short, a corruption of language.
Corrupting conventional language, however, can sometimes be justified-if the benefits outweigh the costs and if alternative means of achieving the benefits are unavailable. It may well be that a group of Latin American scholars have used the term "dependency" (or "dependencia') in a sense that is fundamentally different from the long body of common usage, 92 but it does not necessarily follow that other scholars should therefore redefine their terms to bring their usage into line with these Latin American scholars. We must first ask whether the phenomena these authors wish to describe can be analyzed without the concept of dependency. The answer is almost certain to be "yes." In the first place, the "process of incorporation of less developed countries into the global capitalist system and the 'structural distortions' resulting therefrom" can be described adequately without reference to "dependency." In the second place, according to Caporaso and Duvall, the concept of "dependency" is not an important analytical tool for the dependentistas, but rather a mere "label for a body of theory."9' Unless one is prepared to deny the well-known hypothesis about roses, odors, and names, it would appear that "dependencia theory" can get along quite well without the concept of "dependency."
Redefinition of "dependency" would also violate Oppenheim's criterion of establishing definitional connections, since it would no longer be possible to define it as a state of being "dependent."96 And Malthus would surely point out the violation of his fourth rule, that new definitions must be consistent with the remaining terms-e.g., "independence," "dependence," and "in- 
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is not yet clear that the dependencia theorists always use "dependency" in a sense that diverges fundamentally from ordinary language. In a literature so fraught with ambiguity, inconsistency, and vagueness, it is difficult to say with assurance precisely what is meant by "dependency." It is a safe assumption that those who first began to use the term in the context of dependencia theory were aware, at least in a general way, of its common sense denotations and connotations. Furthermore, some students of dependencia theory have suggested that it is concerned with asymmetrical power relations. 98 Since both Caporaso and Duvall" view "dependence," but not "dependency," as closely related to the standard social science concept of power, such interpretations of dependencia theory suggest that the conceptual gap may be narrower than Caporaso and Duvall imply. Indeed, if all the ambiguities, inconsistencies, obfuscation, and emotional biases could be eliminated from dependencia theory, I suspect that the Latin American usage of "dependency" might often turn out to be closer to the Hirschman-Waltz version of the concept that is generally supposed. Thus, Tony Smith argues that the international economic system "has at its disposal sanctions for transgressing its basic rules which are all the more powerful since their greatest force comes not from an active threat of intervention so much as from a threat of withdrawal, which would abandon these dependent regimes to civil and regional conflict... . So far as I am aware, this last point has not been made by any of the dependency theorists. Nevertheless, it is clearly implicit in their form of analysis."'00I This, of course, sounds very much like Hirschman's concept of dependence, which brings us back to the special issue of International Organization. Hirschman's description of himself as the "founding grandfather" of dependency theory should at least make one suspicious of assertions that his concept of dependency is fundamentally different from that of the dependentistas. III Dependence as power terdependence. Except for the recent article by Caporaso and an occasional passing reference to Bachrach and Baratz, both sets of literature are almost bereft of references to the social power literature.'03 Galtung asserts that imperialism is a kind of power relationship but proceeds to ignore the social power literature altogether. Packenham, on the other hand, declares that one advantage of treating dependence as a form of power is that it "allows the literature on power to teach us something about what dependency means."'04 It is in this spirit that the issue will be considered here. It will be argued that dependency can be treated as part of a large family of social science "power terms" without distorting the basic common sense meaning of the term and that such treatment would eliminate much conceptual confusion, thus making dependency terms more useful tools for social science research. I will discuss seven dimensions of power with reference to dependency relationships. Although these dimensions are well known to power analysts, each of them has been virtually ignored by either dependencia theory or North American writers on interdependence, and often by both. The dimensions to be discussed include the relational nature of power, the multidimensional nature of power, actual versus potential power, actors' intentions, costs, power resources, and reciprocity.
Power as relation
One of the most important elements of social power analysis since 1950 has been the relational definition of power. Instead of defining power as a property of the power wielder, it has been defined in terms of an actual or postulated relationship between two or more actors.'05 Thus, to treat dependency as a power term is to imply the existence of at least one other actor. Thus, when an individual or a state is described as "dependent," the obvious question is, "with respect to whom?" It should be specifically noted that the actor on whom one is dependent may be another state or it may be a rather vague conglomeration of other actors, such as "other countries," "the rest of the world," or "the international capitalist system. " There is general agreement in the social power literature that a minimum specification of a power relation must include both scope and domain. 107 The implication of this multidimensional characteristic of power is that the same actor can be simultaneously strong and weak-e.g., powerful with respect to some scopes of some actors and weak with respect to other scopes of other actors. The same state may be strong with regard to deterring nuclear attack on its homeland by other nuclear states but weak with regard to "winning the hearts and minds" of Third World peoples. 108 Dahl has taken an unambiguous position on the importance of specifying scope and domain. 119 Nagel, p. 16. There is a rich scholarly literature treating "anticipated reactions," which could be useful to students of dependency. For a thorough discussion and bibliography, see Nagel.
proportional to the availability of those goals to B outside the A-B relation. 120 Caporaso points out that "a full specification of the structural existence of dependence . . . would include: 1) the magnitude of B's interest in or desire for a-good (x); 2) the extent of control of x by another actor A; and 3) the ability of B to substitute for x or B." Although both Emerson and Caporaso provide useful explications of dependency relations, both are compatible with describing such relations in terms of the magnitude of the opportunity costs of severing the relationship. Indeed, the latter concept subsumes all of the components identified by Emerson and Caporaso.121 If one seeks a parsimonious way to explain dependency relations, it is difficult to improve upon the idea of the opportunity costs of breaking the relationship.
Another reason the concept of costs is helpful in treatments of dependency is that policy alternatives can be discussed more sensibly. Discussions of dependency often portray the dependent actor as "having no alternatives," or as having "alternatives closed off." "This kind of rhetoric," as the Sprouts observe, "never means what it appears to mean. The statesman always has alternatives."122 When someone says that the United States has no alternative to importing oil or that Canada has no alternative to trading with the United States, they really mean that alternatives involve costs that the parties are unwilling or unable to pay. Clearer understanding of dependency relations would be achieved if alternative relations were described as more or less costly rather than as existent or nonexistent.
Power resources
The concept of power resources has generated much confused and tautologous thinking about power relations. 123 It does not follow, however, that all statements linking dependency to power are tautologies. Although dependency relations are a form of influence 125 I refer to "most" rather than "all" such statements because some avoid tautology in a technical sense by excluding one or two items-usually "skill" or "bargaining ability"-from the list of power resources. Skill is similar to other power resources in that it may not be used in some situations. Parents who play games with their children, for example, rarely use all the skill they possess. Since skill is obviously one of the means by which an actor can influence the behavior of other actors, its arbitrary omission from the power resource category should at least be explained. Dahl admits that skill could be treated as a power resource, but his only explanation for not treating it as such is that "it is generally thought to be of critical importance in explaining differences in the power of different leaders." The same could be said, of course, for a number of other power resources. [ 30 Thus A's ability (potential power) to make B go without oil can serve as the basis for A's influence on B with respect to other activities. Saudi Arabia, for example, might use its ability to make Japan reduce its oil consumption as the basis for influencing Japan's position on the Arab-Israeli dispute. The effectiveness of an explicit or implicit threat to cut off Japan's oil supply unless it withholds support for Israel is likely to be greater if Japan really is dependent on the threat-issuing state with respect to oil. A threat by Egypt to stop exporting oil to Japan would probably not be very effective as a means of changing Japanese behavior.
The proposition that dependency (specified as to scope and domain) can serve as a power resource (specified as to scope and domain) is useful and nontautologous. As long as one is careful to specify scope and domain, tautology can be avoided. The foregoing arguments suggest that dependency is simply a particular type of potential power relation.
Variations in the fungibility of power resources are also a frequent source of confusion. In general, political power resources are much less fungible than economic power resources. 'I' Any particular economic power resource can usually be converted into another kind of economic power resource. Money, as a highly liquid medium of exchange that also serves as a standard of value, facilitates such resource conversions. In the political realm, however, there is no close counterpart to money; therefore, it is much more difficult to convert one kind of power resource into another. This lack of fungibility of political power resources, together with the multidimensional nature of power relations, increases the probability that an actor may control large amounts of potential power with respect to some scopes but relatively small amounts of potential power with respect to other scopes. Thus, a nation may be powerful with respect to deterring nuclear attack but weak with respect to getting one of its citizens elected Secretary-General of the United Nations.
If there were a standardized measuring rod in terms of which the power to deter attack could be compared with the power to secure foreign aid, political power analysis would be much easier-almost as easy as economic analysis.
Dependency poses a similar problem in that a state can be dependent on another state with respect to cultural enrichment or industrial machinery but may not be dependent with respect to military security or oil. Caporaso notes the question of whether "dependence" is to be regarded as an "issue-specific 129 Lasswell and Kaplan (p. 84) define a "form of influence" as a "kind of influence relationship specified as to base value and scope." (It should be noted that in this essay I am using the terms "influence" and "power" interchangeably.) 130 In a stable social relation (where there is a recurrent interaction between the parties rather than interaction confined to a single occasion) a pattern may emerge in which one actor controls the other with respect to particular situations and spheres of conduct-or scopes, as they have often been called-while the other actor is regularly dominant in other areas of sitiuated activity. Thus a wife may rule in the kitchen, while her husband controls the disposition of family income.
Of course, whether ruling over the kitchen "balances" ruling over the disposition of family income depends on whose wife one has in mind! One wife may view such a situation as "balancing out"; another may not. A wife who regards ruling over the kitchen as lower in status and importance than ruling over the checkbook is likely to view the situation described by Wrong as "unbalanced." Similarly, state A may depend on state B for raw materials and foodstuffs, while state B depends on state A for manufactured goods and technology, a situation that could be labeled "intercursive dependency." Some states may view this as "balanced" dependency, but others may regard it as "unbalanced."
Conclusion
This essay concludes as it began, with a review of Oppenheim's criteria for judging scientific concepts.
1. Operationalization. In explicating the concept of power, Dahl noted that to define it "in a way that seems to catch the central, intuitively understood meaning of the word must inevitably result in a formal definition that is not easy to apply in concrete research problems. . . . In practice, the concept of power will have to be defined by operational criteria that will undoubtedly modify its pure meaning."'139 The same could be said about "dependence."
Both the concept of power and the concept of opportunity costs involve counterfactual conditions, and this makes both concepts hard to operationalize. Since opportunity costs are the basic defining characteristic of dependence, at least in its second meaning, the difficulty also applies to research on dependency. 140 This is an awkward situation; but then, no one has ever seriously suggested that power analysis or dependency analysis is easy.
2. Definitional connections. By this criterion the dependency analyst has a potentially easier task than the power analyst. In the English language, at least, there is no verb form of the word "power"; but "dependency" has one, along with several closely related and potentially useful semantic cousins: "dependent," "dependence," "independence," and "interdependence." All of these terms share the underlying intuitive notion of relations in which the opportunity costs of severance are high (low in the case in "independence") for at least one of the actors. Such a family of related terms can provide the dependency theorist with a useful vocabulary as long as the underlying conceptual unity is preserved.
3. Factual connections. Defining interdependence in terms of mutual sensitivity merely draws attention to the fact that one thing affects another, a fact that is obvious and can be established without the concept of sensitivity interdependence. Defining interdependence in terms of opportunity costs, however, directs attention to "certain features of the subject matter which are of theoretical importance but often not readily apparent."I'4' Counterfactual conditions, such as the opportunity costs of altering a relationship, are an example par excellence of facts that are not readily apparent.
4. Not precluding empirical investigation. Defining power and dependency in terms that allow for variations in scope, weight, and domain might be viewed as necessitating a "pluralist" view of social relations as opposed to a view emphasizing monolithic power structures. Such is not the case. Insisting that power and dependency relations be specified as to scope, weight, and domain allows for the possibility that the pluralists might be right, but it does not prejudge the truth or falsity of their position. If, indeed, dependency relations do not vary significantly in scope, weight, or domain, this will become apparent and will provide support for the monolithic dependency structure position. 142 5. Ordinary language. The main body of this essay has emphasized conventional usage, especially with respect to the "sensitivity/vulnerability" and "dependence/dependency" distinctions. The most salient weakness in the literature on these distinctions is the complete absence of any work that (1) acknowledges alternative definitions, (2) treats unnecessary deviations from common usage as an undesirable characteristic in scientific concepts, and (3) considers both the costs and benefits of introducing a new distinction or redefining an old concept. If one's definition diverges significantly from 140 Caporaso's admission that with only one exception "a serious explanation of counterfactuals was not taken up" by the contributors to the special issue of International Organization is, in effect, admitting that the heart of the matter was virtually ignored. ["Introduction," p. 11.1 "' Oppenheim, "The Language of Political Inquiry," p. 305. 142 The weakness of the position of Cardoso and Faletto is that their approach precludes empirical investigation of certain dimensions of dependency (pp. viii-ix). Cf. Nagel, pp. 5-6, 177.
